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ABSTRACT 
Although the role of industrial policy in economic development is a frequent topic of debate in both the 
literature and the political arena, most such discussions focus on industrial policymaking at the national 
level. Using a case study of a potato cluster in China, we show that industrial policymaking at the local 
level contributes greatly to economic development. Many of the industrial policies affecting the cluster—
including leveling land, developing better varieties, establishing a potato trade association, lobbying for 
increasing freight car quotas, and attracting processing firms—were implemented at the local level, 
highlighting the need for discussion of local industrial policymaking as a major determinant of cluster 
development. As the case study demonstrates, economic development is a continuous process with 
constantly evolving binding supply-side and demand-side constraints. Often, after a local policy helps 
remove one binding constraint, a new one emerges that, in turn, may require a new set of local policies. 
Therefore, the success of a potato cluster depends upon local industrial policies that respond to emerging 
binding constraints at different stages of the cluster’s development. 
Keywords:  economic transformation, clusters, comparative advantage, local industrial policy, 
poverty 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The literature is home to a lively debate on the usefulness of industrial policy
1. Skeptics often question 
bureaucrats’ ability to pick the right industries for support. And, in the past, well-intentioned industrial 
policies, such as import substitution industrialization, have led to price distortions, resulting in inefficient 
resource allocation across sectors and stagnant economic growth (Baldwin 1969; Pack and Saagi 2006). 
Believers in the efficacy of industrial policymaking argue that many advanced economies, such as United 
States, Germany, France and Taiwan, have intervened actively in their domestic economy through such 
policies during their various stages of development (Chang 2003, 2009; Evans 1995; Wade, 2009). 
Recent work by supporters of industrial policymaking concentrates on how best to implement 
such policies. Because individual firms often face externalities in the process of product upgrading and 
diversification, some scholars reason, government can play a facilitating role in providing key public 
goods and services to overcome the externalities. Therefore, the reasoning goes, good industrial policies 
are always helpful and needed. The real question in these scholars’ minds, then, is not if industrial policies 
should be implemented, but rather how to best design and implement them (Rodrik 2009). Similarly, Lin 
(2010b) argues that previous instances of failed industrial policies should not prevent governments from 
pursuing such policies at all. Instead, governments should learn from the failures as well as from instances 
of success. He points out that the violation of a country’s comparative advantage is a key reason for 
policy failure. Lin (2010a) proposes six strategic steps by which a country can identify its comparative 
advantage and implement industrial policies. 
2 
Such views face stiff opposition. Tendulkar (2011) is skeptical that governments can correctly 
identify and nurture opportunities for structural change and sustained growth through industrial policies. 
Pack (2011) insists that the amount of information and knowledge required for industrial policymaking 
goes beyond the scope of capabilities of any developing country’s national government. Willem (2011) 
raises several questions about Lin’s six steps: he points out the difficulty of measuring certain export 
opportunities and the irrelevance of past data due to shifting demand patterns; and he says that 
institutional or geographic differences between countries may render Lin’s first step insufficiently 
informative. 
A common feature in this debate is a lack of distinction between local and national industrial 
policy. Such a distinction can help clarify some of the arguments. For example, critiques that focus on 
informational disadvantages in identifying industries for support at the national level may not apply to the 
local level. In reality, the distribution of industries is often location specific and different regions may 
have different set of industries. Consequently, most industrial policies are likely to occur at the local 
level. Although there exists an emerging but rather limited body of empirical literature on the usefulness 
of industrial policy, most studies focus on the national level; studies of industrial policy at the local level 
are conspicuously scarce. 
Yet local industrial policymaking may be more relevant to local economic development than 
national industrial policymaking for several reasons. First, even under the same national comparative 
advantage, there often exists large production differentiation across regions in a country. One region can 
specialize in one product while a neighboring region specializes in a different one. Consequently, the 
need for and style of government intervention in each region can be quite different. Because different 
                                                       
1 Rodrik (2004) defines industry policy as measures to stimulate specific activities and promote structure change. 
2 The six steps include: (1) Identify those dynamically growing tradable goods and service in other countries which are 
slightly more developed than the home country. They likely represent the country’s latent comparative advantage. (2) Among the 
above list, identify those that domestic private firms have already spontaneously entered and diagnose any binding constraints 
that may inhibit firm from entering and growing. (3) For those industries that are new domestically, the government should 
provide some incentives to encourage the entry of private domestic firms in these industries. (4) Take advantage of unexpected 
opportunities that may arise from the country’s comparative advantage or from new technological breakthrough. (5) In countries 
plagued with poor infrastructure and business environment, set up special economic zones or industrial parks to attract foreign 
firms coming in a bundle. (6) Provide first innovators with time-limited tax incentives, co-financing of investment, or access to 
foreign exchange to compensate for the first movers for their positive externality on other firms.  
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locales can have different industries, binding constraints on both the supply side and the demand side of 
the market may differ across regions. Second, local governments have an informational advantage over 
the central government by virtue of their proximity to the firm level and corresponding knowledge of the 
binding constraints for the local industries. As external factors such as market conditions change, the 
binding constraints evolve as well. Because of proximity to the ground, local governments can respond 
more quickly and effectively than the central government. It is almost impossible to find a one-size-fits-
all national industrial policy for all regions at any given time that adequately addresses these constraints. 
Third, in the Chinese context, local governments have embedded interests in developing their local 
economy. Arrangements such as tax revenue sharing between local and national governments provide 
powerful incentives for local governments to take a more active role in facilitating local economic 
development. 
We examine a potato cluster in Anding County, China, and find several industrial policies that 
have been integral to the cluster’s development. Furthermore, nearly all of those industrial policies—
including leveling land, developing better varieties, establishing a potato trade association, lobbying for 
increasing freight car quotas, and attracting processing firms—were implemented at the local level, 
highlighting the need for discussion of local industrial policymaking as a major determinant of cluster 
development. As this potato cluster demonstrates, successive bottlenecks in the development process call 
for local industrial policies that recognize and address continuously emerging supply-side and demand-
side binding constraints. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual model we use to illustrate 
the role of local industrial policies in our case study. Section 3 describes the location of the potato cluster 
and includes subsections focusing on specific policies and their effects on supply-side and demand-side 
constraints. We conclude with a summary and discussion.  
  3 
2.  A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 
Before delving into our discussion of the Anding County potato cluster, we first articulate a simple 
conceptual model to describe the role of local industrial policies in helping to overcome successive 
demand and supply constraints. Adapted from Sonobe and Otsuka (2006), the model captures the effects 
of industrial policies on cluster-based development. Figure 2.1 plots the demand and supply curves. The 
demand curves are shown as the downward-sloping curves and are labeled with a capital letter D. For a 
small region, a commodity’s price is mainly determined by the external markets, provided that the scale 
of local production is small. Therefore, the slope of the demand curve is initially rather flat. However, 
when local production reaches a certain scale, the market can become saturated, resulting in a sudden 
drop in price as shown in the steeper part of the demand curve. 
Figure 2.1—Market equilibrium in the supply and demand expansion phases as a result of local 
industrial policy 
 
Source: Drawn by authors. 
Note: Policy interventions that shift the supply curve SS′ include improving land quality, breeding better varieties, and so on. 
Local policies that move the demand curve DD′ up include lobbying for more freight car quotas, building storage capacity, and 
developing processing industries. 
In a small region, local governments find it hard initially to have a direct effect on demand 
factors. However, local governments do have several options available to facilitate a rightward shift of the 
supply curve. Using potatoes as an example, the local government can help improve irrigation facilities 
and breed high-yield, virus-free varieties to shift the supply curve rightward from S0S'0 to S1S'1. The 
policy interventions result in a welfare gain as measured by the area S0E0E1S1. However, the resulting 
profits will encourage greater potato production by more farmers, leading to a further shift of the supply 
curve all the way down to S2S'2. At the new equilibrium price E2, it is no longer profitable for anyone to 
expand into potato production. 
At this stage, demand becomes a more binding constraint. Facing deteriorating market conditions, 
farmers and business communities are likely to be more willing to work with the local government to 
overcome the demand bottleneck. There are various ways to attract more demand for local products. For 
instance, a better road can help connect the broader consumer market in remote regions and larger storage 
facilities will enable farmers to store a portion of their potatoes in the harvest season when the price is 
low and sell them later when markets rebound. Such demand-side policy interventions will further 
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This simple diagram illustrates economic development as a continuous process. The types of 
binding constraints may differ at different stages of development, requiring different responses from the 
local government to help address the constraints, as illustrated later in the paper. Furthermore, it stands to 
reason that because the binding constraints are often context- and location-specific, a local government 
would be more capable of figuring out the best solutions to address them than a higher-level government.  
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3.  CASE STUDY: ANDING COUNTY 
Anding County used to be one of the poorest regions in China. It is located in Gansu Province in the 
Loess Plateau, an area with limited rainfall (only 380 millimeters per year). Past agricultural yields have 
been extremely low and volatile as a result of the limited precipitation. The yield of wheat, a primary crop 
of the area in the past, averaged only 125 kilograms per mu (1/6 acre), barely enabling farmers to earn a 
sustainable level of income. In 1980, the per capita rural income was as low as 114 yuan, or 60 percent of 
the national average, meaning that 78 percent of the farmers lived in poverty. Facing such a hostile 
natural environment, the region has surprisingly experienced a dramatic transformation into China’s 
potato capital. Potatoes have replaced wheat as the key crop, accounting for more than 60 percent of 
cropping land in Anding County. More than 30 percent of the rural population is involved in activities 
related to potato production, marketing, and processing. Additionally, farmers generate 60 percent of their 
income from potato production (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1—Potato cropping area, yield, price, and farmers’ income in Anding 





Yield  Price  Income from 
potato 
Net income  Share of 
potato 
income 
(million mu)  (metric ton)  (kg/mu)  (yuan/metric ton)  (yuan/person)  (yuan/person)  (%) 
1997  0.39  247,680  640  320  210  899  23.4 
1998  0.39  504,400  1,300  300  380  1,038  36.6 
1999  0.49  506,604  1,036  340  440  1,188  37.0 
2000  0.54  429,600  800  350  306  1,258  24.3 
2001  0.63  945,000  1,500  160  400  1,365  29.3 
2002  0.67  471,100  700  400  480  1,423  33.7 
2003  0.64  960,000  1,500  240  604  1,484  40.7 
2004  0.74  799,940  1,081  425  860  1,593  54.0 
2005  0.73  800,080  1,096  509  1,050  1,683  62.4 
2006  0.85  889,100  1,046  540  1,264  1,763  71.7 
2007  0.95  1,120,050  1,179  600  1,500  1,868  80.3 
2008  1.03  1,299,860  1,262  600  1,659  2,153  77.1 
2009  1.07  1,121,360  1,048  900  1,400  2,391  58.6 
Source: Anding County Agricultural Bureau and Office for Potato Industry. 
The harsh natural environment in Anding County is comparable to, if not worse than, many sub-
Saharan African countries. Yet both land and labor productivity in Anding County have improved 
dramatically over the past three decades. Thus, the successful agricultural transformation of Anding 
County can provide some useful lessons for other countries at similar stages of development. We discuss 
several steps taken by the county government and the results of these local industrial policies. 
Improving Land Quality 
Land is the most basic asset for agricultural production. However, nature did not bestow Anding County 
with good land. Because of the steep slopes that are common to Anding County, most of the land does not 
hold water during the monsoon season as rainfall simply runs off the hills. For hundreds of years, farmers 
have built terrace fields on their own. In 1956, the Anding County government built a 2-mu terrace field 
as an agricultural experimentation station. This experimental terrace stored water well, resulting in much  
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higher crop yields. As a result of this success, the government decided to scale up its terrace-building 
projects. In 1964, the government mobilized 50,000 young laborers to manually build 24,000 mu of high-
quality terrace land. In the early 1980s, the county government once again established terrace building as 
the main policy tool to improve the natural environment, boost agricultural production, and alleviate 
poverty. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, an average of 50,000 mu of terrace land were built 
annually. 
In 1996, with a 10-million-yuan loan, the county government purchased 100 Caterpillar 
bulldozers. The use of machinery greatly improved the terrace-building process. In just one five-year 
period, from 1996 to 2001, 300,000 mu of new terrace plots were constructed. By 2006, a total of 1.5 
million mu of high-quality terrace fields had been built in Anding County, or 3.9 mu per capita, with 93.7 
percent of the land compatible with terrace building having been converted into terraces. 
As part of a poverty alleviation program, the central government invested heavily in large 
irrigation projects at the river basin level in the 1960s and 1970s in Anding County. The irrigation 
facilities built during the planned economy era laid a foundation for the subsequent rapid expansion of 
potato production several decades later. 
Adopting Potato Production 
After improving land quality, the next challenge is to find the crops that are most suitable to the local 
environment. As mentioned earlier, farmers in Anding County previously produced wheat as a primary 
crop and potatoes as a secondary crop. However, because of frequent drought and soil runoff during the 
monsoon season, wheat yields were on average low and varied greatly across years. 
During the spring, frequent droughts prevent seeds from fermenting. As the harvest time 
coincides with the monsoon season, the concentrated rainfall often floods crops before harvesting. In 
2004, one mu of wheat brought only about 184 yuan of total revenue (125 kilograms/mu × 1.47 yuan/mu). 
Compared with wheat, potatoes are more resistant to drought and therefore more suitable for local 
production. The rainy season, spanning from July to September, coincides with the growth period of 
potatoes. In addition, the dry climate greatly reduces the use of pesticide. Most important, potato 
production has a much higher yield (1,500 kilograms per mu) than wheat (125 kilograms per mu). If labor 
and other intermediate input costs are excluded, farmers earn relatively less money by producing wheat. 
Even at a lower price of 0.3 yuan per kilogram, merely switching production from wheat to potatoes 
would double the total gross agricultural income. 
After the rural reform in the early 1980s, land use rights were distributed to individual 
households, allowing farmers to make their own production decisions.
3 Therefore, local leaders could not 
force farmers to switch their cropping patterns away from wheat to potatoes. Even though farmers had 
planted potatoes in this area for a long time, they saw them only as a secondary crop to supplement wheat 
production. Local residents relied on potatoes mainly for survival in the event of famine, earning potatoes 
a reputation as a lifesaving crop. Although farmers did have the knowledge and technology necessary to 
produce potatoes, they were hesitant to switch from wheat to potato farming. 
Compared with wheat, many farmers thought potatoes carried a larger market risk. In the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the government set a guaranteed procurement price for wheat, assuring farmers that they 
could always sell wheat to the state or market. Without a similar guarantee for potatoes, farmers 
justifiably feared that if they could not sell their potatoes, the surplus would go rotten at home. Moreover, 
considering the relative prevalence of wheat in the local diet, the idea of a steady diet of potatoes in the 
event of lagging sales was not an incentive to grow potatoes. 
Facing resistance from farmers, local officials first mobilized village cadres to experiment with 
large-scale potato production on their land. Although the farmgate price was rather low, the first potato 
adopters still made large financial gains because the higher potato yields largely offset the lower price 
relative to wheat. Having observed the success of cropping potato for a couple of years, more farmers 
                                                       
3 See Du (2010) for details about the course of rural reforms.  
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wanted to switch to potato production. Despite the apparently higher financial reward of planting 
potatoes, many farmers could not afford to buy high-quality seed potatoes. In response to farmers’ 
financial concerns, the local government applied for the poverty alleviation fund from the upper-level 
government and used the fund to subsidize farmers’ purchases of seed potatoes. The demonstration effect 
of village leaders and seed subsidies played an important role in speeding up the adoption of potato 
farming in Anding County. As Table 3.1 shows, in 1997, the total potato cropping acreage was 0.39 
million mu, and in 1999 it increased to close to half a million mu. By 2009, the potato cropping areas 
surpassed more than 1 million mu. 
Establishing a Potato Trade Association 
The dramatic increase in potato production attracted a large number of traders from Shaanxi, Sichuan, 
Henan, and Anhui provinces to purchase potatoes in Anding County. Local farmers knew little about the 
price information in the wholesale markets in big cities as few of them had ever traveled to those cities. 
Because of this information asymmetry, farmers didn’t have much bargaining power. Initially, the 
farmgate price was determined largely by outside traders who captured most of the profit along the supply 
chain from producers to consumers. As Figure 3.1 shows, potatoes had to go through the hands of 
farmers, agents, outside traders, wholesalers, and retailers before reaching the consumer. 
Figure 3.1—Potato supply chain prior to 2003 
 
Source: Drawn by authors. 
Because of the extremely low farmgate price, farmers gradually lost interest in expanding potato 
cropping areas. At the end of 2002, the potato market hit its nadir, and as a result, some farmers reverted 
back to wheat production. In 2003, the potato cropping area contracted in size for the first time since 
1997. This posed a great challenge to the local government’s potato-oriented agricultural development 
strategy. In response, the county government conducted a market survey on the potato supply chain. Local 
officials from the agricultural bureau and some townships were sent to survey the behavior of traders, 
truck drivers, wholesalers, and retailers in several major cities. The numbers shown in Figure 3.2 were 
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Figure 3.2—Potato value chain in 2003 
. 
Source: Pan Yanjun, Anding Office for Potato Industry. 
Figure 3.2 clearly illustrates the rent allocation among different parts of the chain in 2003. 
Farmers sold their potatoes to agents of outside traders at 0.28 yuan/kilogram, where their production cost 
was 0.26 yuan/kilogram. Farmers earned a meager profit of two cents per kilogram without even counting 
their own labor cost. After paying the agents a fixed fee of 0.01 yuan/kilogram, the cost to outside traders 
equaled 0.29 yuan/kilogram. The traders then had the potatoes shipped to wholesalers in major cities and 
sold them at 0.48 yuan/kilogram. The transportation cost was about 0.1 yuan/kilogram, enabling the 
traders to pocket a net profit of 0.09 yuan/kilogram. Retailers bought the potatoes from wholesalers at a 
cost of 0.50 yuan/kilogram and sold them at the retail market at an average spot price of 0.60 
yuan/kilogram. After extracting transportation, rent, and labor costs, the retailers netted a profit of about 
0.05 yuan/kilogram. As the survey results indicated, farmers earned the least along the supply chain 
despite having to endure backbreaking farming work. 
The survey results showed local leaders that outside traders claimed a lion’s share of the value 
added along the potato supply chain. They also demonstrated that the general lack of market information 
and collective bargaining power were the key reasons why the farmgate price was so low. 
Considering the impossibility of quickly reallocating the rents along the supply chain through 
market forces, the local government decided to intervene in the market to reduce the monopoly powers of 
outside traders. The first initiative, in July 2003, was to establish a potato trade association. The major 
objective of the association was to train local traders to take the place of outside traders. Many of the 
association members initially had rather low levels of education. And although many had help from 
outside traders when purchasing potatoes, they knew little about market operations outside Anding 
County. To train indigenous traders and resolve this knowledge gap, the government sponsored 50 
members to participate in a one-month marketing training in the School of Economics and Management 
at Lanzhou University.
4 
The association has three tiers. The top tier exists at the county level, where the main 
responsibility is to collect market information and have potatoes shipped to the wholesale markets. This 
part of the association hired informants in major wholesale markets to collect market information and 
feed the information to its members. The second tier is composed of members at the township level, 
whose primary task is to set up potato collection stations, purchase potatoes from agents or farmers, and 
then sell them to the county-level members or to traders from elsewhere. The villages have members who 
comprise the third tier and act as agents for first-tier and second-tier members. They charge a commission 
for purchasing, sorting, packaging, and shipping potatoes on behalf of traders at the top level. In support 
                                                       
4 The training has paid off, as many of the trainees have become leading traders in the potato industry nationwide.  
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of the association, the Anding County government enacted a regulation banning nonmembers of the 
potato association from directly purchasing potatoes from farmers, effectively limiting the activities of 
nonlocal traders and greatly eroding their monopoly power. 
The association has grown at a phenomenal rate since its establishment in 2003. At its inception 
the association had about 30 founding members. By 2009, it had attracted more than 3,000 members, 
including 467 first-tier members, 1,322 second-tier members, and more than 2,000 third-tier members. 
The association performed so well that its president, Dajiang Liu, was elected to the National People’s 
Congress. 
The association’s mission is to promote the potato industry. To do that it tries to ensure that 
farmers receive a competitive price and thus have the proper incentive to produce potatoes. At one point, 
some traders in remote locations were buying potatoes from farmers at an unfairly low price, greatly 
damaging the reputation of the association. Beginning in 2004, the county government and the association 
worked together to implement a minimal procurement price, and they announced both the market and the 
minimum guaranteed prices in different media, including local radio, television, and marketplaces. Such a 
floor reduced fluctuations in the farmgate price and prevented traders from cheating farmers, thereby 
ensuring a stable potato supply. 
Building Local Wholesale Markets 
With the rapid increase in market share, the local government and the potato trade association decided in 
2005 to build wholesale markets in Anding County, since local wholesale markets would help discover 
pricing information in a much cheaper, timelier, and more accurate way than collecting the information 
from wholesale markets all over China. The county government earmarked 150 mu of land for developing 
the wholesale market. The wholesale marketplace is a shareholding company financed through a public–
private partnership. The marketplace has experienced two phases of development. The first phase started 
in April 2005 with a total investment of 46 million yuan. The national government contributed 2.7 million 
yuan, the county government invested 8.34 million, and the association raised 35 million from its 
members. The total construction area is 38,600 square meters, including a 15,000-square-meter 
marketplace for potato sales. The government formally approved the second phase in 2007. The total 
investment of 27 million yuan for that phase came from various sources, including the central 
government’s policy subsidies (5 million), the local government’s matching fund (2 million), bank loans 
(10.35 million), and the shareholding company’s self-financing (9.8 million). The second phase involved 
updating the inspection, information, and electronic fund transfer systems. The market turned out to be a 
big success. It quickly became China’s largest potato distribution center, price formation center, and 
information distribution center. In response to the increasing trade, the market was further expanded to 
1,500 mu in 2009. 
The secondary wholesale markets also grew rapidly. As Table 3.2 shows, in 1995 there was only 
one secondary wholesale market. By 2005, that number had increased to seven and land area had risen to 
0.14 million square meters. By 2010, 10 more secondary wholesale markets had been built, and total land 
area had increased to 0.37 million square meters. Additionally, 63 village collection points had been set 
up across the county, up from only two in 1995. The primary outcome of these results is that strong 
spatial market coverage greatly reduces transaction costs and increases the transparency of price 
information, making it harder for any traders to unfairly compensate farmers. 
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Table 3.2—Market development in Anding 
Year  Secondary township wholesale markets     Village collection points 
  
















1995  1   10,000   4,000     2  4,800   2,200  
2000  1   10,000   4,000     6  18,370   13,070  
2005  7   139,760   344,800     23  74,220   29,780  
2010  17   366,943    ,082,700      63  174,941   161,385  
Source: Anding County Agricultural Bureau and the Office for Potato Industry. 
Figure 3.3 shows how, as of 2010, the producers are linked to consumers. Comparing this with 
Figure 3.1, we see that the supply chain has completely changed in just seven years. 
Figure 3.3—Market structure of potato supply chain in 2011 
 
Source: Drawn by authors. 
Expanding Market Access 
As Figure 3.4 shows, China has four major potato production regions. Prior to 2000, each production 
region primarily served the markets in nearby provinces due to the high cost of transporting the crop 
across regions. Anding County followed a similar pattern, and potatoes were initially sold primarily to 
Sichuan and Hubei provinces. As the total production area expanded, the potato market in the nearby 
provinces became saturated, resulting in a measurable price drop in 2003. 
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Figure 3.4—China’s four major potato production centers prior to 2003 
 
Source: Drawn by authors. 
Although the demand for potatoes was still high in the large city centers on the coast, Anding 
County is far away from major coastal cities (1,600 kilometers, 1,755 kilometers, and 2,380 kilometers 
from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, respectively). For example, the cost of transporting potatoes by 
road from Anding County to Shanghai was as high as 0.45 yuan/kilogram. Despite the rather low cost of 
production, when potatoes were shipped to Shanghai, their price was no longer competitive with those 
produced in Shandong. But if the potatoes were transported to Shanghai via rail, the transportation cost 
would amount to only half of that by road. However, the Ministry of Railway controlled the number of 
rail freight cars allocated to Anding County, and because Anding County was a rather poor region, the 
demand for freight cars used to be low, and consequently it received a smaller freight car quota. As potato 
output grew, so did demand for more freight cars. The limited quota of freight cars thus prevented Anding 
potatoes from reaching the coastal markets. 
In 2004, facing the inevitable freight car bottleneck during the harvest season, the Anding County 
government urgently requested help from the provincial government. Xiankui Wang, a deputy provincial 
party secretary, used to work at the Ministry of Railway prior to his current position. Using his influence, 
Wang lobbied the Ministry of Railway to allocate 3,650 freight cars in 2004 to transport potatoes from 
Anding, a sharp increase from 1,507 freight cars in 2003 (see Table 3.3 for the number of freight cars 
over the years). When the freight trains full of Anding potatoes arrived in Shanghai, Nanjing, and other 
big cities in the coastal region, many traders from the production centers in Inner Mongolia and Shandong 
were scared away. The Anding potato price immediately began to act as the determinant of the national 
potato price. Consequently, Anding potatoes were able to reach a larger market. 
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Table 3.3—Number of freight cars allocated to Anding for potato transportation by Ministry of 
Railway 
Year  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
No. of freight cars  1,507  3,650  3,956  3,303  5,735  5,462  6,145 
Note: Surveyed by authors. Each freight car can carry up to 60 metric tons of potatoes. 
To help the potato industry in Anding County, the Ministry of Railway made an exception and 
allowed the Anding County government to determine its quota based on actual demand. By 2009, Anding 
County’s allocation of freight cars had risen to 6,145, with each freight car able to carry 60 metric tons. 
This resulted in 0.37 million tons of potatoes, or about one-third of total local output, being transported by 
rail. 
Improving Storage Capacity 
The seasonal nature of potato production presented another constraint. In northern China the harvest 
season lasts from late September to December. Naturally, the price tends to be low in this period as fresh 
potatoes flood the markets. After late December, the price is more likely to go up as potatoes become 
more scarce close to the Chinese New Year. Given the V-shaped price pattern, farmers were reluctant to 
dump all their potatoes onto the market in the fall even if the transportation conditions allowed. Instead, 
they preferred to store the potatoes a little longer and sell them later at a better price. Seeing this need for 
storage, in 2004 the county government came up with a new policy to encourage farmers to build potato 
storage facilities by offering a 200-yuan subsidy. It even provided free land for members of the potato 
association or enterprises to build larger-scale storage facilities. Thanks to the dry environment, even the 
indigenous storage facilities in Anding County can keep potatoes fresh for up to six months. Based on our 
household survey in 2010, we found that on average each household has more than one potato storage 
facility. 
Table 3.4 documents the rapid development of storage facilities over time. In 2004, the total 
storage capacity was 250,000 tons; by 2010 that number had risen to 600,000 tons. The storage system in 
Anding County comprises four levels. First, at the county level, the Anding Wholesale Market itself has 
eight large electric-powered centrally controlled storage facilities with a total capacity of 45,000 tons. 
Second, at the lower, township level, 68 storage caves with natural draft ventilation have been built, 
providing 65,000 tons of total capacity. Third, the village collection points are equipped with 2,200 caves 
with a total storage capacity of up to 130,000 tons. Fourth, individual farmers have dug 246,000 
microcaves, each averaging less than 10 tons of storage capacity, at home or near their land. These small 
caves can store up to a combined 360,000 tons of potatoes. 
Table 3.4—Storage capacity in Anding 





(>300 metric tons) 
Household caves 
(<10 metric tons)    
  





(1,000 tons)  No.  Capacity 





2004  -  -  4  4  16  5  100,000   241  250 
2005  1  10  12  12  50  15  120,000   263  300 
2006  4  33  52  52  240  70  150,000   295  450 
2007  5  36  60  60  300  92  160,000   312  500 
2008  5  36  60  60  300  92  160,000   312  500 
2009  5  36  60  60  300  92  160,000   330  518 
2010  8  45  68  65  2,200  130  246,000   360  600 
Source: Anding Statistical Bureau. 
Note: Tons refer to metric tons.  
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The larger storage capacity helps farmers manage uncertainty in the market. For instance, in the 
fall of 2008, the potato price bottomed out due to a nationwide bumper harvest. In mid-October, the 
wholesale price at Guangzhou had dropped to 800 yuan/ton. At that price, farmers could not earn a 
sufficient income. However, as a result of the readily available storage facilities, farmers could put a 
significant portion of their potatoes into storage. By early 2009 and before the Chinese New Year, the 
potato price bounced back to a significantly higher level, enabling farmers to sell their stored potatoes at a 
more profitable price of 0.6 yuan/kilogram. Using the increased storage capacity, the average farmer 
earned 1,600 yuan of income from potato production despite the unfavorable market conditions during the 
previous fall. 
Breeding Better Varieties 
With an increasing supply of potatoes and rising income, consumers demand tastier and better-looking 
varieties. In response to market demand, the local government took steps to develop new and better 
varieties to improve the competitiveness of potatoes produced in Anding County. 
The agricultural extension station in Anding County tested several varieties to local conditions, 
and two such varieties were selected and widely adopted. The first is Lingshu #3, developed by Gansu 
Academy of Agricultural Science. It is renowned for its high yield, drought resistance, short growth 
period (only 105 days), and long storage life. The average yield per mu of this variety is as high as 1,800 
to 3,500 kilograms. It contains 21.2 percent starch and 0.13 percent sugar. Since consumers do not find 
this variety especially palatable due to the rather low sugar content, it is mainly used for processing 
starch. 
In the early 2000s, the Anding agricultural extension station rented land from Ran Zhen, a farmer 
in Daping Village, Qinglan Township, to experiment with breeding new potato varieties. However, after a 
few years, the experiment was called off due to budget cuts, and the station simply returned the land full 
of different varieties to Ran Zhen. To save money, the farmer used the seed potatoes from her land to 
plant potatoes. At the time of harvest, to her surprise, the potatoes in one parcel of her land looked 
extremely good and tasted delicious as well. She picked a few potatoes and had them tested in the Anding 
agricultural extension station. This variety turned out to be superior to other popular varieties at the time 
in both taste and resistance to disease. Its sugar content is as high as 0.32 percent. Not surprisingly, it 
enjoys a 30 to 40 percent price premium in the market versus other conventional varieties, although its 
yield is slightly lower. 
As a root crop with asexual reproduction, potatoes are prone to virus attack. As such, it is critical 
that farmers have access to virus-free seedlings in order to avoid diseases and other consequences of 
possible virus attacks. In the mid-1990s, the county government set up a potato detoxification center and 
promoted virus-free seedlings. The center has 140 employees, including 18 senior and 31 junior scientists, 
and is equipped with the leading potato detoxification and reproduction technologies available in China. 
The center also has the capacity to quickly detect potato viruses and inspect quality. In collaboration with 
various partners, it currently produces 20 million seedlings and 30 million pedigrees per year which are 
virus free. 
The large-scale expansion of reproducing the seedlings is primarily undertaken by other, mostly 
private firms. In 1989, Anding had only one state-owned drought agricultural research center that could 
produce virus-free seed potatoes. Since 2000, however, six private enterprises have begun to produce 
seedlings. All of these firms are located in Dingxi Drought Agricultural Science and Technology 
Demonstration Park, which is one of 21 national agricultural science and technology demonstration sites. 
The impact of this growth in research has two distinct yet complementary characteristics. On the one 
hand, the high-quality seedlings provide a foundation for the sustainable growth of potato production in 
Anding County. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of potato cropping areas demands more seedlings, 
inducing development of the local potato breeding industry. By 2010, Anding County had become the 
largest breeding center of virus-free potato seedlings in China.  
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Developing the Processing Industry 
Because the consumer demand for potatoes is rather inelastic, a rapid increase in supply will saturate the 
market, drive down prices, and make it difficult to expand potato production further. By comparison, the 
demand from processing industries has more growth potential. Whereas consumers are picky about the 
shape and taste of potatoes, those factors are of less concern to the starch industries. After the price drop 
in 2003, the local government realized the importance of developing the potato processing industry. If 
there were enough processing plants, they could absorb the low-quality potatoes left over from the 
consumer market and provide a floor price for those low-quality potatoes. This would bring additional 
income to farmers and generate tax revenues for local government. 
Before 2003, there were a limited number of family workshops producing low-quality starch and 
noodles by processing merely 5 percent of total potato output. In 2003, the local government intensified 
its effort to attract investment in the potato processing sector by offering a package of incentives to 
investors. First, it provided them with land at a discount price to build factory buildings. Aside from land, 
other complementary infrastructure, such as electricity and water supply, was also guaranteed. 
Additionally, by working with banks, the government helped secure loans for the investors. Perhaps more 
important, the local government promised to provide a stable and adequate supply of potatoes with high 
starch concentrations. To ensure the balanced need for the consumer market and input use in the 
processing industries, the county drafted a potato cropping plan according to soil and water endowment in 
different regions. According to the plan, the northern part would focus on high-starch potatoes, the south 
would specialize in edible potatoes for vegetable use, and the Chuanshui district would target potato 
production mainly for french fries and chips. Such a plan assured investors that the processing plants 
would have access to a stable supply of potatoes. 
In 2003, the county successfully attracted investment in two processing plants. As a result of the 
new plants, in total the county processed 40,000 tons of potatoes and output 8,000 tons of starch (see 
Table 3.5). In 2004, two more processing plants were established, increasing the county’s total starch 
production capacity to 40,000 tons. In 2005, Anding County attracted eight more processing plants, 
raising the total starch processing capacity to as high as 100,000 tons. In total, these firms processed 
250,000 tons of potatoes, or more than 30 percent of the total output that year. 












2002  3,000    100  3,000  450 
2003   8,000    200  8,220  1,370 
2004  13,000    500  14,650  1,960 
2005  26,000    800  30,960  2,720 
2006  36,600  3,500  1,500  62,000  2,910 
2007  27,000  2,600  1,200  45,000  3,650 
2008  48,000  4,000  1,500  120,000  2,830 
2009  25,300  2,000  2,500  46,800  1,100 
Source: Anding Bureau of Economy and Trade. 
In 2006, the 12 firms invested more than 50 million yuan to expand the scope of their product, 
including a 9,000-ton potato flour production line, a 10,000-ton modified starch production line, and a 
3,000-ton frozen french fry production line. Additionally, some firms started to produce potato chips. 
Four dedicated unit trains of starch were shipped from Anding County to Tianjin. All together, more than 
300,000 tons of fresh potatoes were locally processed, absorbing one-third of total output. In 2007, three 
more production lines for potato flour, noodles, and specialized starch for textile industry use were put 
into place, and that year the plants processed a total of 350,000 tons of potatoes. In 2008, these firms 
invested in a few more production lines, including one for potato chips, and processed a total of 400,000  
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tons of fresh potatoes. In 2009, firms in Anding County produced 2,500 tons of french fries and potato 
chips to meet the increasing demand of fast food restaurant chains such as McDonald’s. Furthermore, 
some of the products have been exported to countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
The county government has put great effort into helping enterprises upgrade product quality. For 
instance, the local government helped the firms secure research-and-development grants from the upper-
level government, register patents, and apply for national or provincial well-known brands. In 2010, 
Anding County hosted the China Potato Exhibit for the sixth time. This well-known potato industry 
promotion attracts traders to come from all over China to Anding County and place orders for fresh 
potatoes and processed potato products. 
Since 2005, the government has promoted the business model of “dragon head enterprise (leading 
enterprise) + producer association + production base + farmers.” Under such a model, a company signs a 
contract with a producer association prior to the cropping season, wherein the producer association 
promises to serve as a production base for the company. The association then coordinates with farmers to 
plant the designated potato varieties. This is a win–win arrangement facilitated by the production 
association. On the one hand, the contract reduces farmers’ market risk and enables them to concentrate 
on their production. On the other hand, the company secures a stable supply of potatoes. With just one 
year’s experimentation, the area of contracted farming jumped from 90,000 mu in 2005 to 260,000 mu in 
2006. As Table 3.1 shows, despite the rapid expansion of potato cropping area, the potato price has not 
declined. In contrast, it has shown an upward trend. Accordingly, potato production has contributed to a 
steady rise in income for farmers.  
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4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper narrates the successful story of the development of the potato cluster in Anding County, 
Gansu Province, China. Anding County used to be one of the poorest places in China; its people 
could hardly feed themselves. Within a few decades, however, the county has seen the formation of a 
comprehensive potato industry cluster (see Figure 4.1). Anding County has subsequently become one 
of the largest potato production, distribution, and processing centers in China. The local government 
has enthusiastically fostered the cluster’s emergence and growth. However, its policies vary 
according to stage of development. As the cluster grows, the binding constraints evolve over time as 
well. This requires the local government to be sensitive to the needs of farmers and entrepreneurs and 
come up with endogenous and timely solutions, especially in the face of the opportunities presented 
by crises (Ruan and Zhang 2010). 
Figure 4.1—Anding Potato Cluster 
 
Source: Drawn by authors. 
The potato cluster is not a special case. For example, a cluster in a neighboring county specializes 
in Chinese medical herbs, and another one is renowned for the Chinese art of paper cutting. As shown in 
Long and Zhang (2011), China’s industrialization over the past several decades has been largely cluster 
based. Our paper explores the connection between this process of industrialization and the 
implementation of local industrial policy in developing regional specialization within China. Supporting 
evidence for this case study can be found in many other clusters. 
This case study also has relevance for agricultural development in other developing countries. 
Because of differences in terrain, soil, water, and temperature, the comparative advantage in producing 
agricultural products is likely to vary greatly across regions. Therefore, it is hard for a central government 
or donor to prescribe a unified national agricultural development strategy that applies to all locations at 
any given time. In comparison, local governments have better access to information about the binding 
constraints faced by firms and therefore are in a better position to come up with practical solutions. 
However, many local governments in developing countries lack the necessary incentives to develop their 
local economy due to the institutional arrangement with their respective upper-level governments. If they 
do not keep a keen eye on the development challenges themselves, they may find that merely relying on 
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